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I. STATEMENT 0 F THE CASE
A. STATEMENT OF ADDITIONAL FACTS
Connie Taylor, filed the original verified petition in the probate couri on November 12,

2004, requesting the probate cOllli to appoint her clients as trustees of the Theodore 1. Jol111son
Revocable Tmst. The petition was executed by R. Joh11 Taylor as a verification of the facts
contained in the petition. Page 2 of the verified petition states under oath, "the petitirmei"s 88-

year-old mother, Helen Taylor, is the sole remaining bene./icim:l' of this trust by virtue o.fthe

terms of a Disclaimer, Release and Indemnity Agreement."
Earlier on September 9, 2004 DaHan Taylor in response to a question asking him to
provide in his own words tlle effect of the Disclaimer Ab'1"eement, provided deposition testimony
under oath, which recited, "And Taylor, all children are disclaiming interest in favor of their
mother, Helen Taylor, so that she can get the remainder of her assets in the Tmst." (R. Vol 1. p.

000582).
Thiriy-two days later after verifying his petition before the probate couri, Jolm Taylor
provided deposition testimony on December 14, 2004 that his mother was to receive either the

land or any dollar amount awarded as a result of the lawsuits (R. Vol I. p. 2008).
On January 3 1,2005 approximately 80 days after Jolm Taylor executed the verified
petition, Reed Taylor provided deposition testimony under oath, and in response to questioning
about who would receive the benefits of the litigation, responded that his mother "probably gets

it all". In addition Reed Taylor furtber provided deposition testimony under oath regarding who
would get the proceeds relating to the second lawsuit, by testifying, "My intent is -- Jim not going
to say exa.ctly how it's going to be disbursed. My intent would be for my mother.... Well, like I
said, as far as, uh -- I haven't talked to, specificalJy, the ones that are out of town. As far as John
and r are concerned, LIh, we're doing it for our mother, so" When asked directly about his
brother's anticipated benefits from the litigation, Reed Taylor provided deposition testimony
under oath by stating, "We're not looking for money out of it, if that's where you're going".

( R. pp. 000566, 000567).
On May 2, 2005, John Taylor provided testimony before the Honorable Judge Beiter
stating under oath, "Well, p1imarily, to pursue tbe claim for the trust. We have always thought it
was a valid claim because I think that, for the benefit -- my mother is the beneficiary of the trust,
and we expect tbat we will eventually win on this claim." (R. pp. 000348,000350).
Judge Wilper entered his Memorandum Decision and Order on July 28,2005 and held the

Taylor Brothers, now with standing as trustees, had waived lights to rescind the contract as "once
a pariy treats a contract as valid after the appearance of facts giving rise to a right of recision, the
right of recision is waived." ( R. p. 0006491n. 10).
The Eagle real estate market underwent a huge increase in land valuations stmiing in

2005. The market 2006

\flaS

just full on fire. Almost out of control. You could just pretty much

name your price for almost anything. (Tr. 2/3/11 pp. 212 In. 21 th111 214 In. 25).

During the course of the depositions ofJolm Taylor and Dallan Taylor, the deponents
were represented by Connie Taylor. No objections were interposed at the deposition of J 01111

Taylor regarding his answers relating to questions regarding who was entitled to any proceeds
involving the litigation. 111e deposition was taken after the Disclaimer At,'Teement was executed
(Tr. 2/3/11 pp. 375 In. 15 thnl377 In. 25). No cCllTections were made relating to any deposition
answers of JOhl1 Taylor or Dal1an Taylor relating to questions and answers as to who was the
beneficiary under the trust after the Disclaimer Agreement was executed (Tr. 2/3/11 pp. 378 In. 1
thm 378 In. 20).
There never was any supplementation oftlle Taylor brothers' discovery in the Judge
,\Vilper case relating to any changes to the beneficiary status after the Disclaimer Agreement was
executed. There were specific requests for discovery directed to the Taylor brothers in the Judge
Wilper matter specifically relating to any amendments to the Johnson trust. DUling the course of
litigation the Taylor brothers provided no discovery supplements indicating there were any
amendments or changes to the trust which relating to the beneficiary status. ((Tr. 2/4111 p. 63 In.
7 thm In. 25). The original trust Agreement provided Helen Taylor would only receive income
hom the

C0l1JUS,

which was discretionalY, but under no circumstances was Helen Taylor to

receive anything more than income £I'om the trust.
On April 13, 2009, Connie Taylor representing her prior husband, John Taylor, and her
plior brother-in-law Dallan Taylor, both individually and as trustees of the trust provided her

briefing before Judge Greenwood indicating "that petition contained a typographical elTor; it
stated that Helen Taylor was "the sale remaining beneficiary of the Theodore Johl1son Trust by
virtue of the tenDS of a Disclaimer, Release and Indemnity Ab'Teement," when it should have
stated tbat she was the sole remaining direct beneficiary." (R. p. 001289).

II. AlDDITlfONAL ISSUES ON APPEAL
1.

i\re the Respondents entitled to their attol11eys fees on appeal?

III. ARGUMENT

A. The Independent Action Requesting the Lower Court to Set Aside the .Judgment on
Beneficiaries' Claim.",' Should Be Granted.
The litigants before the COUli all ab'ree that the Taylor brothers had standing to pursue
claims in the consolidated cases captioned Taylor v. Maile 146 Jd. 705,201 P.3d 1282, (2009).
The litigants are in serious disab'Teement over the effects of committing peljury and obtaining
money by false pretenses during the course of litigation before Judge WiJper.
The Respondents have failed to address tIle authority cited by Appellants contained in
Vol 12 Moore's Federal Practice § 60-21 (4)(b), which provides that as officers of the comi the
commission of peljury in obtaining ajudbJment is another species of "fraud upon tIle cOUli". The
Respondents point to tIle amended petition before tbe probate COUli as a cOlTection of the earlier
verified petition. The amended petition before the probate comi was filed without leave of COUli
and was done as a unilateral undelialcing immediately plior to the hearing. (R. p. 001361). The
Respondents aIJege the amended petition before the probate COUli acts to nullifY the plior velified
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petition by 101m Taylor, and the sworn deposition testimony of all oftbe Taylor brothers some
six months earlier. The filing of the amended petition was the first example ofthe Taylor
brothers and tbeir counsel playing loose and fast with the judicial system.
The amended petition filed in tIle probate court executed on April 18, 2005 as a verified
pleading by Jolm Taylor, described the interests of the Taylor brothers as "persons who are
sought to be appointed are contingent beneficiaries of the Theodore L. 10hnson Revocable
Trust". (R. 000840). The Taylor brothers had prior to the execution of the Disclaimer
Af,'reement, described themselves in January 2004, as "plaintiffs are residual beneficiaries of the
Theodore L. Johnson Trust". (trial exhibit 110 p. 380). Before the execution of the Disclaimer
Agreement, the Taylor brothers were residual beneficiaries destined to share in tbe corpus. This
is the status they disclaimed. However, and this is crucial, there was nothing contingent about
their status under tIle ten11S of tbe trust. If anything was contingent it was Helen Taylor's
potential income interest which was solely discretionary with the trustee(s) under the tem1S of the
trust. The Taylor brothers, under the trust, were guaranteed to receive corpus ofthe trust, unless
of course they disclaimed tbeir interest, which is exactly what the paper trail establishes.
Respondents point out that the Honorable Judge Greenwood believed the core of the
appellants' case was centered on the misrepresentation by the Taylor brothers before Judge Beiter
in tbe proceeding to obtain their judicial appointment as trustees. (Clark & Feeney Reply Briefp.
1). The Taylor brothers in all likelihood would have been appointed sllccessor trustees regardless

5

of the initial verified petition or the amended petition. The verified petition of November 2004 is
relevant to our understanding of the Taylor brothers' state of mind as to whether they considered
themselves beneficiaries of the trllst after the execution of Disclaimer Af,'Teement.
Judge Greenwood apparently believed that the appellants' case centered upon tbe
misrepresentations in Judge Beiter's court.
Although the argument is not always easy to foIImv, Berkshire's claims presented
here all hinge on the assertion that the Taylors and their counsel committed a
fraud on Judge Beiter by filing a petition for appointment as Trustees that
contained a false statement. This statement somehow led Judge Beiter to appoint
the Taylors as Trustees, giving them standing to bring the suit which ultimately
led to Judge WiIpds deten11ination that the underlying real estate transaction was
void. This led to the loss of the properiy. ( R. 001373).
In fact Judge Greenwood should have realized, that the Appellants' case centered upon
the fact that the Taylor brothers alleged to Judge Wilper to be something they were not. They
misrepresented themselves to Judge Wilper's Couri, as beneficiaries. The only sif,'11ificant event
in the probate proceedings was the November 2004 verified petition drafted by Connie Taylor
and executed under oath by her husband John Taylor. The verified petition, together with otber
evidence establishes that the Taylor brothers were no longer beneficiaries after their execution of
the Disclaimer Af,lTeement, yet they represented to Judge Wilper that they were beneficiaries.
Judge Beiter's appointment of the Taylor brothers, as trustees, in May 2005 did not afford the
Taylor brotl1ers the right to commit perjury in Judge Wilper's Court regarding their status as
beneficiaries in 2006. TIle admission under oath in probate cOllIi is impOliant because it

6

establishes the Taylor brotllers' reversal of position when they falsely claimed to be beneficimies
in January 2006 before Judge Wilper. Tllat fraud upon the court led to the entry of the Judgment
on BeneficiaJies' Claims. Neither the Taylor brothers nor their counsel ever advised Judge
VVilper that they previously admitted to disclaiming their status as residual beneficiaries. This
reversal set the stage for the fi-aud upon the cOUli. As a result of the Judgment on Beneficiaries'
Claims, the Appellants ,vere not able to present their case against the trust.
The amended petition filed in probate cOUli in April 2005, does not alter the swom
testimony ofDallan Taylor, Reed Taylor and John Taylor stating that they knew they were no
longer beneficiaries after tlle execution of tIle Disclaimer Af,'Teement. Their counsel also knew
tbat the Taylor brothers were no longer beneficiaries oftbe trust as a resuIt oftbe Disclaimer,
Release and Indemnity Af,'reement. When a pleading is amended or withdrawn, the superseded
pOIiiol1 disappears fi-om the record as a judicial admission. It neveliheless exists as an utterance
once seriously made by a party, and when admitted in evidence may be properly considered by
tIle cOUli or jury as an item of evidence in the case. Swanson v. State ofIdaho 83 ld. 126,358
P.2d 387 (1960) citing SbUliliffv. Extension Ditch Co., 14 Idaho 416,94 P. 574; Anderson v.

J-Joops, 52 Idaho 757, 19 P.2d 908; Cl. T Corp. v. Elliott, 66 Idaho 384,159 P.2d 891; Stout v.
A1cNClry, 75 IdallO 99, 267 P.2d 625.
Tl1e recent case of Allied Bail Bonds, Inc. v. County ofKootenni, --- P.3d ----, 2011 V/L
2652475 (2011), cited by the Respondents does not nIter the established case lmv cited in
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Swanson, supra. An amendment to the pleadings serves to replace the prior pleading as to
matters involved in those proceedings. The probate proceedings had nothing to do with
possession or title to the Linder Road property. It was a proceeding for the appointment of the
Taylor brothers as successor trustees only. However, once a statement is made under oath it can
be properly considered in all future legal proceedings to establish the intention of the party
making such a statement under oath. The amended petition cIear'ly was inconsistent with the
prior verified petition and the Taylor brothers' deposition testimony. Clearly inconsistent swom
statements by J oh11 Taylor are relevant to the court's understanding of who was the beneficiary
after the Disclaimer Agreement. Jolm Taylor signed the oliginal probate petition under oath and
32 days later provided similar deposition testimony that his mother would receive the benefits of
the litigation. The filing of the amended probate petition demonstrates playing loose and fast
with the judicial system as the Taylor brothers and their counsel made a detel111ination in Aplil
2005 to cbange course and assert that they remained contingent beneficiaries so they might
benefit from that status and take advantage of their pending appeal.
There is considerably more evidence of the commission of perjury than the initial verified
petition in the probate proceeding. As early as March 2003, COlmie Taylor, representing tbe
Taylor brothers knew that her clients were considering disclaiming any remainder interest in their
Uncle Ted's trust in favor of their motber. She wrote the letter to Thomas Maile, that provided,
" .... children are all considering disclaiming any remainder interest in their uncle Ted's trust so
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that the trust proceeds can be distJibuted to their mothers without delay ... .I just want to be certain
that tl1ere won't be a situation down the line where someone claims that they would not have
disclaimed their interest ifthey had a better idea of the amount of money that was involved." ( R.
000535).
The Taylor Brothers in their successful attempt to gain control of the trust, after their
initial complaint brought as beneficiaries was dismissed, provided additional evidence that tbey
were plall11ing to disclaim their interests in the trust. On April 14,2004, Connie Taylor drafted a
letter to Beth Rogers' attomey Bali Harwood which established that her clients, the Taylor
brothers, would disclaim their rights as beneficiaries of the trust in exchange for the successor
nominated trustee, Beth Rogers' cooperation and sun-ender of her trustee status, which would
allow the Taylor brothers to gain control of the trust (R. 000561)_ The combination of the two
letters demonstrates that the Taylor brothers were intending to disclaim their interest in the trust
as early as March 2003. Such a declaration against interest made in the April 2004 letter was
more than just a warning that Beth Rogers, as trustee, could be released fi-om liability if she
provided an affidavit, as argued by the Taylor brothers in their reply brief (Taylor brothers' Reply
Bliefp.21). The April 2004 letter is consistent with the March 2003 letter and consistent with
the swam deposition testimony of the Taylor brothers as well as the original verified probate
petition, in that it indicates their intent to disclaim beneficiary status.
The record has ample evidence through deposition testimony that the Taylor brothers
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treated tIle Disclaimer Af,'Teement as extinguishing their beneficiary interests in the trust. All
tlu'ee brothers provided testimony that demonstrated tbeir intention and understanding of the
Disclaimer Af,'Teement (see appendix 1 to tbe Appellants' Opening Blief).
COlmie Taylor, as an officer of the court, engineered the process for her clients to gain
control of the trust and lmew her clients' intentions of disclaiming their interest in the tmst.
C01111ie Taylor as counsel for the Taylor Brothers sat tlu'ough deposition testimony as her clients
admitted that Helen Taylor was to receive the full benefits of any litigation. COlmie Taylor
flllther knew that prior to the Disclaimer Af,rreement, Helen Taylor had no right under the tmst to
receive any pOIiion of the trust COIVUS (R. 000432 In.9 thm 25). Tbe trust specifically provided
that after tbe death of Ted Johnson, the trustee could pay to, or apply for the benefit of Helen
Taylor, Hazel Fisher, Betty FamwOlih, and Joyce Selley, such sums from the income of their
20% share of the COl1JUS of the trust, as the Trustee deems reasonable for the maintenance,

education, suppOli and health of the said beneficiary dllling tbeir lifetime. Helen Taylor had no
light to obtain any principal or cOl1JUS of the trust, a fact well known to the officers of the cOUli.
Ultimately the Taylor brothers, aided by their attomeys, pell)etrated peljmy upon the distlict
court in filing their amended complaint representing that they were beneficjaries in January 2006
after tbe Supreme Comi ruled that beneficiaries have a right to sue.
49 CJS § 672. (2011) Collusion, perjury, or other misconduct-Perjury and subomation
of perjury provi des:
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PerjUlyor false sweaIing is a species of intrinsic, not extrinsic, fraud, and hence
the 111le against f,'Tanting reIieffor perjury is in accordance with the general rule
tbat relief in equity ordinarily cannot be had for intrinsic fi-aud_ However, if tbe
perjury prevents a full adversari al trial of the issues, or improperly procures tbe
court's jurisdiction and judf,'111ent, then such peljll1Y is extrinsic and relief against a
judf,'111ent so obtained may be had in equity....
it has been 11eld that where a lawyer engages in a conspiracy to commit a fi-aud on
the court by the production offabricated evidence, and by such means obtains a
judgment, a court of equity may grant relief against the juclf,'111ent. Similarly, it has
been held that subornation of perjUly by an attomey or the intentional
concealment of documents by an attomey constitute "extrinsic fi-aud," and allows
ajuclb'111ent to be set aside due to fi'aud upon the comi.
The underlying case before Judge Wilper involved two consolidated matters. The first
action was filed by the Taylor brothers while they were still beneficiaries of the trust, in JanUaIY

2004. The second of the consolidated matters was the suit filed by the Taylor brothers as trustees
of the t111st in July 2004 after the execution of the Disclaimer A):,,'Teement. Ultimately, based
upon the perjUly by tbe Taylor brothers that they remained beneficiaries of the trust, Judge
Wilper entered his Order Granting Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judb'l11ent on Beneficiaries'

Claim on May 15, 2006. The Orcler Jed to the Jud2,'ment on Benefici31ies' Claims which was
entered on July 2006. Tbe Judf,'111ent provided:
This cause came on before the Honorable Ronald J. Wilper for hearing on a
Motion for Summmy Judf,'1nent on tlle Beneficiaries' Claim. Based upon the
findings of fact and conclusions of law contained withinthis COUli's May 15,
1006 Order Granting Plaintiffs' Motion for Summ31Y Judf,'111ent on Beneficiaries'
Claim,
NOW, THEREFORE, IT HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED
as fo11O\\1s,
... The title to the property commonly refelTed to as "the Linder Road properiy"
and more p3Iiicularly desclibed in Paraf,'Taph 3 of this Judf,'111ent shall be quieted
11

to the Theodore L. Jo1111son Revocable Trust, in fee simple...
The Defendants' remaining counterclaims and affinmtive defenses, all of which
were based on eitller equitable claims or the asseltion that the Plaintiffs were
wrongfully interfering with the Defendants' light to possess the Linder Road
Property, are hereby dismissed. Specifically, those claims are as follows:
A.
Counterclaim I (tOliuous interference with contract between Defendants
and their lending institution)
B.
Counterclaims VII and VIII (equitable estoppel and Quasi-Estoppel) ....
(R. 000119) .
Thereafter tbe Appellants attempted before Judge Wi1per to have their claims to the title
against the trust adjudicated upon equitable principles. Judge Wilper entered his Memorandum
Decision and Order

011

July 15, 2006 again reiterating his position set fOlih in the Jud!;,'111ent on

Beneficiaries' Claims. The Memorandum Decision and Order of July 15,2006 recited:
The COUIi finds that the effect of the COUli's imposition ofa constructive trust on
the Linder Road propeliy is the reconveyance of the propeliy to tl1e Trust and the
quieting of the title in favor of the Trust. See Klein v. Shaw, 109 Idaho 237, 140,
706P.2d 1348,1351 (Ct. App.1985)(ho1clingthatapaliyuponwhoa
constructive trust is imposed "is treated as if he or she had been an express tmstee
hom the date of the wrongful holding and is required to reconvey tbe property to
the plaintiff); see also I.e. § 6-410 (describing an action to quiet title as that
"brought by any person against another who claims an estate or interest in real or
personal propeliy adverse to him, for the PU!1Jose of deten11ining such adverse
claim"). (R. 000119).
T11e taking of tJ1e real propelty without any consideration of any of the equitable positions
between the trust and appellants before Judge Wi1per was solely a result of the peljury committed
by the Taylor brothers in falsely asserting their role as residual beneficiaries of the trust in 1006.
As stated by Justice Eism3I111 in Taylor v. Maile II, "Mai1es have not argued on appeal that the
appropriate remedy for closing the sale without cOUli approval would be to set aside only the
12

closing, rather than also setting aside tbe contract of sale. Thus, we have not addressed tbe
appropriate scope oftlle remedy for a violation ofIclaho Code § 68-1 08 (b)". The MaiIes lost
their opportunity to address before Judge Wilper any issues between tbe tmst and the Appellants.
The Taylor brothers' perjury prevented a full adversarial trial of the issues before Judge Wilper,
CJS § 672, supra. The above authority does not require that one losing rights to a fair and full
adjudication as a result of perjury must attempt to con-ect the same by appeal. Respondents argue
that tbeMailesfiledtheirnoticeofappealandraisedthisconceptinTaylor;v.Maile II (Taylor
brothers' Reply Briefp. 4). Only standing was argued as heing affected by tIle Tay]or brothers'
misconduct, however, no issue was raised relating to any cause of action related to the criminal
activity of Taylor brothers or their attomeys. The merits of the claims were never presented nor
detennined. Standing is focused not on the merits of the issues raised, but upon the pmiy who is
seeking tbe relief. Miles v. Idaho Power Co., 116 Id. 635, 641, 778 P.2d 757, 763 (1989).
The appellants were assured by tIle .§,'Tantor of the trust and tIle successor trustees, the
Rogers, that tbe trust virould stand by the transaction (R. 000539). The Motion for Summary
Judgment in February 2006 was based solely upon the Taylor brothers' criminal conduct in
committing perjury and obtaining money by false pretenses based upon the asseriion that they
were residual beneficiaries in 2006. ( R. pp. 000655, 000660).
The Respondents have argued this matter is analogist to the case of Rae v. Bunce
145 ld. 798, 186 P.3d 654 (2008). (Clark & Feeney Reply Blief p. 9). Tlle Rae matter involved
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a claim of a fi'aud upon the cOUli, based upon opposing counsel's submission of a proposed order
by mail not by motion. The present matter involves a complaint against officers of the cOUli who
are alleged to have acted in the following manner:
That all defendants, acted with oppressive, fl:audulent, wanton, malicious or
outrageous conduct as aIIeged above. That defendants acted in a manner that
was "an extreme deviation from reasonable standards of conduct, and that the act
was perfol111ed by the defendants with an understanding of or disregard for its
likely consequences" and tbat the defendants acted with an extremely harmful
state of mind, whether that be tenned "malice, oppression, fi'aud or b'ross
negligence", "malice, oppression, wantOlli1eSS; or simply "deliberate and
willful." Tbat defendants well lmew that tbe above conduct would be oppressive
as to the plaintiffs and others. (R. 000080).
l!

The present matter deals \vith peljury, subordination of perjury and obtaining money by

false pretenses. Tbe two matters are as different as day and night. The pariy asseliing a claim of
fi-aud on the c01..l1i must establish t11at CU1 unconscionable plan or scheme was used to improperly
influence the cOUli's decision and that such acts prevented the losing party fi'om fully and fairly
presenting its case or defense. Rae, supra.
The burden is on the claimant to prove sufficient facts to set aside ajudb'ment, by clear
and convincing evidence. LR.C.P., Rule 60(b)(3). Kuhn v. Caldwell Banker Landmark, Inc. 150
ld. 240, 245 P .3d 991 (1010). The records clearly establishes the Respondents actively engaged
in conduct that played loose and fast with the judicial system which ultimately amounted to
criminal conduct. The climinal conduct of tbe respondents is clearly established in the record.
The deposition testimony of Dallan Taylor is entirely consistent with the velified petition
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before the probate comi as executed in November 2004. The deposition testimony of Jolm
Taylor is entirely consistent with the verified petition before the probate court as executed in
November 2004. The deposition testimony of Reed Taylor is entirely consistent with the
verified petition before the probate comi as executed in November 2004. The testimony ofJolm
Taylor before the probate cOUli in May 2005 is entirely consistent with the verified petition
before the probate court as executed in November 2004. The letter of Marcb 2003 authored by
COlmie Taylor is entirely consistent with tbe verified petition before the probate comi as
executed in November 2004. The letter of April 2004 allthored by Connie Taylor is entirely
consistent with the verified petition before the probate court as executed in November 2004.
However, if that verified petition of November 2004 contained a typo as ar!;,TLled by the Taylor
brothers, all the other testimony, and aU the Jetters are in eITor. The recent case ofNC-D.H., Inc,
v. Gamer, 218 P.3d 853 (Nev, 2009) provides:
The most wideJy accepted definition, which we adopt, holds that the concept
embraces only that species of fi'aud which does, or attempts to, subveri the
integrity of the comi itself, or is a fi'aud pell)etrated by officers of the court so that
the jlldicial machinery cannot perform in tbe usual marmer its impaliial task of
adjudging cases ... and relief sbould be denied in the absence of such conduct.
In addition to his duties to his clients, a lawyer also owes a duty of" loyalty to the
comi, as an officer thereof, that demands integrity and honest dealing with tbe
court. And whenbe departs [r'om that standard in tbe conduct of a case he
per]Jetrates [r'aud upon the comi," We lawyers, judges, and practitioners alike are
very ... concemed about how our profession is perceived. We're velY proud of
what yve believe is an honorable profession and-we're velY concemed when
something like this bappens. It hurts us all. It really does.
If a party establishes that ar1 unconscionable plan or scheme was used to improperly
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inf1uence the couri's decision, and that such acts prevented the losing party £i'om fully and fairly
presentil1g his case or defel1se, then "fi'aud on the comi" exists. In re Paternity of Tomiki, 518
N.E.2d 500 (Incl. App. 1988). The party asserting a claim of £i',md on the court must est::tblish
that an unconscionable plan or scheme was used to improperly influence the COlllt's decision and
tbat such acts prevented the losing party £i'om fully and fairly presenting its case or defense. 47
Am..Tllr. 2d, .Tuclsrments § 728 (2006). As stated in the case of Hmtford v. Hmiford 53 Ohio
App.2d 79,371 N.E.2d 591 (Ohio App. 1977):
Vvhile no precise definition offraucl upon the court is possible, we believe, like
most courts consideril1g the matter, that the term as used in regard to obtaining
relief B'om judgment must be nan-owly construed to embrace only that type of
conduct which de:6les the court itself, or fraud which is pel1)etrated by officers of
the COllrt so as to prevent the judicial system B-om functioning in the custommy
manner of deciding the cases presented in an impartial manner.
The Appellants' independent action to set aside tIle Jud~::,'ment on Beneficiaries' Claim
should be b'Tanted, as officers of the comi actively conspired to commit peljury to obtain a
judgment that precluded the appellants from presenting their full case in the consolidated matter
before Judge vVilper.

B. The Appellants Did Act in a Prudent Mauner in Asserting the Taylor Brothers Lacked
Standing and Did Act 'Within a ReasonaiJie Time in Filing Their Independent Action to Set
Aside the Judgment 0111 Beneficiaries' Claiu!...
In Idaho our (omi's have ruJed that an independent action under I.R.C.P.
60(b) may be brought ·within a reasonable time. The question of reasonableness is ordinmily a
question of fact to be resolved by tl1e trier of fact. Claims brought under I.R.C.P. 60(b) are not
16

baITed by res judicata because they are one of the recognized "avenues ... for attacking a
juclgment Davis v. Parish, 13 lTd. 595, 961 P.ld 119 (1998).
An independent action to set aside ajudt,'l11ent can be based upon the doctrine of "fj'aud
on tbe couri". 7 Moore's Feeleral Proctice ~ 60.33. However, unlike an action for extrinsic fi'aucl,
an action for "fi-aud on the

COLlli"

is not limited by laches and may be brought at anytime. 7

Moore's Federal Practice ~ 60.33. See In re Patemity of Tomiki, Sllpra.

H

Fraud on the cOlJri" is a

claim that exists to protect the integlity of the judicial process, and tberefore a claim for fl.-aud on
the cOlni cannot be time-balTed. 12 James We. Moore et al., Moore's Federal Practice §
60.21 [4][gJ & 11.52 (3d ed.2009) (citing Lacewood v. Bowls, 46 FRAT 625,634 (D.D.C.1969).
TIle appellants discovered the impact of the respondents' criminal activity while
prepming tbeir appellants' opening brief in Taylor v. Maile II. Six months had expired since
Judge Wilper entered tbe Jud[;,'ment on Beneficiaries' Claim. Consequently, the only way for the
Appellants to bring the misconduct to the COUli's attention was to present an argument relating
to issues of standing. T11e issue of standing is jmisdictional, and it may be raised at any time.
Tungsten Holdings Inc., v. Drake, 143 Td. 69, 72,137 P.3d 456,459 (2006).
Respondents argue that the appellants are simply attempting to take another bite at the
apple. This is untrue, fraud upon the COUJi as an issue or claim has never been tried or
detennined, only standing was discussed and determined. There is no dispute that the Tnyl or
brothers bad standing to sue under Taylor v. Maile II. Standing does not confer a benefit upon a
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litigant to commit perjury, subom perjury or obtain money by false pretenses. Standing doe not
confer a benefit lIpan a litigant which results in the opposing pariy fi'om fairly and fully having
an adjudication of a]] claims, including the claims in the Judge Wilper matter that may have
existed between the appellants and tbe trust.
Appellants argument that the Taylor brotbers committed misconduct was advanced to
defeat their standing. The SlIpreme Court in Taylor v. Maile found the Taylors bad standing. The
appellants filed this action in December 2007 while tbe appeal was still pending.
Although the JlIdf,'I11ent on Beneficiaries' Claims was entered by Judge Wilper in July
2006, there remained the question of unjust emiclm1ent which was tried in October 2006. That
trial involved a claim of unjust enrichment to the trust's right to title, it l1ad nothing to do with
the balancing of equities between the pariies. The Appellants filed the independent action wbile
the appeal was pending, mindful of the requirement that Rule 60 (B) requires a "reasonable time"
for the filing of tbe independent action. Given the fact that there remained issues to be tried
before Judge Wilper and tbe appellants had to prepare for such a trial, raising the matter as ar1
issue of standing and almost simultaneously filing an independent action to setaside the
judgmen t was reasonable.

Rule 60(b) is silent as to when an independent action Ciln be

maintained based upon criminal activity. To hold otherwise would be tantamount to concluding
that all matters involving fi'aud and/or criminal conduct wOlIld have to be filed 1,vithin six months
of the date of Judb'111ent.
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C. The Crirnimul Activity of tine Respondents Defeats LA.ny ,AppEncatioEil of tine Doctrine of
Res Judkata.

4. 7 Am. Our. 2d .T Udf::,'111ents § 537, provides the C!ppropriate standard in determining ifres

judicCltCI should apply under tIle facts of this case. The Appellants were denied the opportllnity to
present their case against the trust, before Judge Wilper. The pCI:jury by the Taylor brothers gave
Judge Wilper the wrongful impression tlwt the Taylor brothers held a financial interest in the
corpus of the trust in 2006. However, in truth and fact, tbe Taylor brothers bargained away their
interests in the trust to gain control of tbe trust, as trustees in July 2004. This was done to
acJVClI1ce a lawsuit by the trust when their own lawsuit was dismissed.
The case of Living Designs, Inc. v. E.I. Dupont de Numbers and Co., 431 F.3d 353
C.A.9 (Hawaii 2(05) provides law which explains that once fi'aud has been demonstrated in prior
litigation, other l1ol1-fi-aud claims are permissible. TIle Living Desi&'11, supra, relied upon
certification responses from the Hawaii Supreme Court, and held at 373 of 431 F. 3d:
The district COUli also enoneously dismissed Plaintiffs' non-fraud claims on the
grounds of the litigation privilege. Matsuura III, 330 F. Supp.2d at 1128. In
Matsuura II, the HJwaii Supreme Court stated that "Hawaii COUlis have applied an
absolute litigation privilege in defamation actions for words and writings that me
material and peliinent to jlidicial proceedings." 73 P.3d at 692. The COUli
examined the policy considerations behind the privilege and decided not to
expand tlle protection of the privilege to claims outside of defamation actions,
holding tbat "uncler Ha\vaii Jaw, a paliy is not immune from liability for civil
damages based upon that party's fJ'aud engaged in during prior litigation
proceedings." Td. at 700, 706. TIle court appears to emphasize that many of the
policies vveighing against the application of the privilege do so only \Iv'hen fraud
was committed in the prior proceedings. Id. at 693-99. In Clccordance with tbe
Hawaii'I Supreme COllli's analysis, so long CIS a cause of action for fraud is
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asselied, the litigation privilege does not protect subsequent litigation asserting
other causes of action stemming fl:om the fraud allegedly conm1itted in prior
proceedings. Thus, we hold that Plaintiffs' non-fi'aud claims are not ban-ed by the
litigation privilege under Hawaii law.
The action of the Respondents in misrepresenting their status as beneficiaries of the hust
in 2006 amounted to criminal conduct. Criminal behavior as alJeged in this case is more severe
than fraud. The actions of the Respondents should not be tolerated as they demonstrate tampering
with the administration of justice in Idaho and should be a clear exception to any defense of res
judicata. The non fi'aud claims set forth in the amended complaint need to be resolved by the
trier of fact and cannot be ban-ed by res judicata.

D. The Doctrine of Res Judicata Does Not Apply.
Neither issue preclusion nor claim preclusion apply. Five factors are required in order for
issue preclusion to bar the re-litigation of an issue detennined in a prior proceeding: (1) the party
against whom the earlier decision was asseried had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue
decided in the earlier case; (2) the issue decided in the prior litigation was identical to the issue
presented in the present action; (3) the issue sought to be precluded was actually decided in the
prior litigation; (4) there was a final judgment on the merits in the prior litigation; and (5) the
pariy against whom the issue is asseried was a pariy or in privity with a pariy to the litigation.
TicorTitle Co. v. Stani on 144 Id. 119,157 P.3d 613, (2007). Justice Eismann's concuning
opinion establishes that not all the issues were resolved in Taylor v. Maile n. As Justice
Eismann indicated, the appropriate scope of the remedy for a violation of Idaho Code §
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68-1 08(b) was not 1i tigated nor detenl1ined as an issue 011 Taylor v. Maile II. The Respondents'
criminal behavior ancUor the effects thereof were not issues which were actually decided.
RegardJess of whether an issue is explicitly set forth in the party's brief as one of tbe iSSUES on
appeal, if the issue is only mentioned in passing and not supported by any cogent argument or
authority, it cannot be considered by the appellate couri. Taylor v. ALA Services Corp. WL
3904754 (Idaho 2011), Liponis v. Bach, 149 Idaho 372, 374, 134 P.3d 696, 698 (2010). Issue
preclusion does not apply to the present mJtter.
Idaho uses a transactional approach to claim preclusion. U.S. Bank Natl. Assn. v.
Kuenzli, 134 Ie!. 222, .226, 999 P.2d 877, 88 I (2000). "The doctrine of claim preclusion bars not
only subsequent re-litigation of a claim previously asserted, but also subsequent re-litigation of
any claims relating to the same cause of action which were actually made or which might have
been made." Hindmarsh v. Mock, 138 Idaho 92, 94, 57 PJd 803, 805 (2002). Claim preclusion
has three elements: (1) same pariies or their privies; (2) same claim; and (3) final judf,'111ent.
Tacker Ti't1e Co. v. Station, 144 Idaho 119, 124, 157 P.3d 613, 618 (2007). Watkins v. Peacock
145 Iel. 704, 184 P.3d 210(2008). TIle Appellants had no callse of action or claim until hlclge
vVilper entered the Judgment on Beneficiaries' Claim. Moreover, the Decision in Taylor v.
Iv1cNicbols, 149 TeL 826,243 P.3d 642 (2010), holds that a valid claim against an opposing
attomey must wait until tlle conclusion of the underlying litigation.
The Respondents argue that the appellants' claims are baITed because the appellants
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arguably incurred "some damages" during the proceedings before Judge Wilper. The existence
of objectively ascertainable injury is simply an analytical tool to be used in detell11ining, as basis
for tbe Clccrual of a professional malpractice action, when "some damage" has occurred. Stuard v.
Jorgenson, 150 Id. 701,249 P.3d 1156 (2011). The "some damage" ruJe has been Llsed to
determine if an applicJble statute oflimitations applies in a professional mJlpractice case. TIle
case of Taylor v. McNichols, Sllpra, establishes that because of the complexity ofmoclem
litigation, one cannot deten11ine the scope of an opposing counsel's wrongful condllct until the
underlying case is cone! uded. This reasoning is applicable to the present matter in detem1ining
that neither claim preclusion nor "some damage" rule applies in this case. Even through the
Respondents committed peJjury in MJfch 1006, there was no definitive amount of attomeys fees
relating solely to t1wt point. The case continued through trial in October 2006 on the Maile's
counter-claim. One c<JmJot objectively detem1ine when some d~U11ages were incuned relating to
attomey fees and as sllch tIl ere is no res judicata defense.
TIle Respondents have arf,'1.lcd tllat tIle Appellants claims for 1egalmalpractice were
frivolous. (Taylor brothers' Reply Briefp. 13). This is a bllacious argument on the pmi of the
Taylors, because tbe Appellants never alleged attomey malpractice.
In tIle present matter tbe appelletnts claim among otller things, the respondents were
negligent in misrepresenting to the comi their clients' status JS beneficiaries under tIle trust,
when in prior swom pleadings and plior testimony it was established that tbe Taylor brotllers'

mother was the sole beneficiary of the trust as aresuIt of the Disclaimer AbIfeement. The
attomeys prepared the clocllmentation containing the pe1jured testimony, had previously prepared
documents containing the true facts, filed pleadings asserting facts the attomeys knew were not
true, and had participated in deposition and comi proceedings establishing the true f;Jct that tIle
Taylor brothers' mother was tbe sole beneficiary of the trust.
Tbe allegations of the amended complaint allege conduct and an agreement betv/een the
Respondents to accomplish an unlawful objective. ( R. 000257). Such a civil conspiracy is not,
by itself, a claim for relief Tbe essence of a cause of action for civil conspiracy is the civil wrong
committed as the objective of the conspiracy, not the conspiracy itself. Mmmos v. Moss, 143 Id.

927,931, 155 P.3d 1166, 1170 (2007). Such wrongful conduct give lise to a number of civil
remedies, to wit: (l) the Taylor brothers and the attomey Respondents conm1itted wrongful acts
that are prohibited under tbe Idaho Racketeering Statue (Count Eleven); (2) the Respondents
committed acts tbat constitute abuse of process (Count Five); (3) tbe Respondents committed a
fraud upon the comi (COll11t One); (4) the Respondents committed wrongful conduct in filing a
verified pleading which was diametrically opposite to an earlier verified pleading previously
submitted by tbe Respondents before another tribunal, requiring an imposition of a constructive
trust (Count Two); (5) the Respondents committed acts constituting negligence and/or 6'T08S
negligence (Count Six and Eight); (6) the Respondents committed acts which constitute equitable
estoppel, quasi estoppel and/or judicial estoppel, (Counts Nine, Ten, and Twelve).

The elements of negligence are well established: (1) duty; (1) breach; (3) causation; and
(4) damages. EDtJte ofBed:er v. CaJJahan, 140 Td. 522, 516, 96 P.3d 613,627 (2004). As it
general rule, an attomey will be held liCible for negligence only to his or her client and not to
someone with whom tbe attorney c10es not have un attomey-cJient relatiollsllip. HalTigfeld v.
Hancock, 140 leI. 134,90 P.3d 884 (2004), Wick v. Eastman, 122 Id. 698,838 P.2c1301 (1992).
However, our SlIpreme Court 11as indicated that a cbim can exist between a non-client and an
attoll1ey for a c13i111 of negligence. See McPheters v. Maile, 138 rd. 391, 395, 64 P Jd 317, 3:21
(2003).

A pari)' is not immune from liability for civil damages based upon that
party's fraud engaged in during plior litigation proceedings. Matsuura v. EJ. Du Pont De
Numbers, 102 Hawaii 149,73 P.3d 687 (2003). A third pmty con hold a lawyer liabJe if the
attomey exceeds the scope of11is employment or acts for personal gain or substantially assisting
in a client's breach of fiduciary duty. Attomeys must not knowingJy counselor assist a client in
committing a crime or £I"aud. Taylor v. ]vfcNichols, supra. The Appellants have alleged
sufficient facts against the attomeys indicating the att0ll1eys activeJy participated in perpetrating
a fraud upon the court which created damages to the Appellants.
TIle Appell[mts were denied the opporhmity to present their case against tbe trust before
Judge Wilper. The peljury by the Taylor brothers gave Judge Wilper the wrongful impression
that the Taylor brotbers were beneficiaries and had a fin::mcial interest in the corplls oftlle trust in
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2006. In truth, the Toylorbrotllers bargained away their interests in the trust to gain control of
the trust in 2004 to advance a lawsuitby the trust when their own lawsuit was dismissed. The
AppeUants have alleged valie! claims against the respondents which are not barred by the doctrine
of res judicata.
E. A AppHcation of Lwvl" of tile Case Does Not Apply Because of Respondents' Criminal
Behavior.

Fraue! vitiates everything it touches. Tusch EnteIlJlises v. Coffin ]13 Id. 37, 740 P.2d
1022 (1987). Fraud upon tIle court makes void the orders and jue!b,'111ents of that court. An
attempt to commit "fraud upon the cOUli" vitiates the entire proceeding and deprives tbe court of
subject matter jurisdiction. In re Village of Willowbrook, 37 Ill. App.2d 393 (1961). A decision
produced by fi'aud upon the court is not in essence a decision at all, and never becomes final.
Fraud vitiates a judf,'111ent caused by tIle active agency of some party to the proceeding, as the
couri is misled and deceived as to the facts upon which it attempts to administer the law, ane! the
mistake is equally efficacious in procuring a wrong. Trim v. Trim, 33 So.3d 471 (Miss. 10] 0).
TIle Respondents' criminal behavior constitutes a fraue! upon the COlui and deprives the
couli of subject matter jurisdiction. There can be no law of case under tbese facts. Under the law
ofthe case doctrine, \vben "tIle Supreme COllIi, in deciding a case presented states in its opinion
a principle or rule of law necessary to the decision, such pronouncement becomes the law (lfthe
case, and must be adhered to thJOughout its subsequent progress, both in the district court and
upon subsequent appeaL" The rule is well established and long adhered to in this state that

where, upon an appeal, the Supreme Court, in deciding a ca.se states in its opinion a principle or
rule of law necessary to the decision, such pronouncement becomes the law of the case, and must
be adhered to thTOughout its subsequent prob,rress, both in the trial conrt and upon subsequent
appeal. ... If In re Barker v. Fischbach & Moore, Inc., 110 Td. 871,872, 719 P.2cl 1131, 1132
(1986)(citing Suitts v. First Security Bank ofIdaho, 110 rd. 15, 713 P.2d 13 74 (1985)).
The present action is an independent action under I.R.C.P. Rule 60 to set aside a
judb'111ent based upon fraud upon the

COUli

and for claims for damages as a result oflitigation

misconduct by the Respondents. The law of the case doctrine has no application to the CUlTent
proceedings. The Respondents arf,TLJed that the stcmding oftlle Taylor was "law ofthe case"
before the district court (Taylor brothers' Reply Briefp. 9). However, under the "law oftl1e
case!! principle, on a second or subsequent appeal the comis generally will not consider errors
which arose prior to the first appeal and which might have been raised as issues in the earlier
appeal. See 5 Am . .Tur.1d Appeal and En"or § 752 (1962). The doctrine discourages piecemeal
appeals and is consistent witb the broad scope of claim preclusion under the analogous doctril1e
of res judicata. .Tanmm v. Hale, 111 Td. 951,842 P.ld 188 (C.A. 1991).
Respondents' contention that "law of the case" applies, is elToneous, bec<luse this case is
not about standing but rather tbe effects of criminal behavior in obtaining a judgment. If the law
ofthe case is strictly applied there could never be a Rule 60(B) independent action filed \vhen
there are allegations of crimina! conduct that amount to tampering with the administration of
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justice. Fraud upon the COllli "will be found only in the presence of such tampering with the
administration of justi ce as to suggest a wrong against the institutions set up to protect and
safegLlclrd tbe public. Compton v. Compton, 101 JeL 328, 334, 612 P.2d 1175, 1181 (! 980),
quoting Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hmtforcl Empire Co., 322 U.S. 1.38, 246 (1944).
\Vhen an issue of standing is raised, the focus is not on the merits of the issues raised, but
upon the party who is seeking the relief Scona Inc. v. Green Vvil10w Trust, 133 Id. 283,286,
985 P .2d 1145, 1148 (1999). There is no present issue raised by the AppeJIants cOl1ceming the
standing oftlle Taylor Brothers. Simply because one has standing to sue, that does not afford the
right or privilege to obtain ajudgmentbasecl upon peljllJY that deprives an opposing pariy their
right to an adjudication of their claims and defenses. There is no "law of the case" that applies to
tIle present claims.

F. Tile Consideration of Extrinsic Evidence and Parol Evidence Is Permissible in
Establisbing That the Taylor Brothers Conmlitted Perjury and Obtained Money by False
Pretenses.

The Taylor brothers themselves lmew wl1at tbeir beneficial interest in the trust was after
they executed the Disclaimer Af,rreement in ]004. The Taylor brothers k11ew the truth of the
misreprese11tation as it was solely within their intention. There has been no judicial
detenllinatiol1 that the Taylor brothers remained beneficiaries after the 2004 Disclaimer
Af,'Teement. The Taylor brothers arh'1le tbat the letter of April 2004 aut]lored by CC)]111ie Taylor is
inadmissible as parol evidence. (Taylor brothers' Reply Briefp.22). There is no merger under
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these circumstances. The Respondents failed to strike the letter [r'om consideration before tbe
lower court and are precluded [r'om arglling new matter at the appeJIate level.
A latent ambiguity exists wbere an instrument is clear on its bce, bLlt loses tklt clarity
when applied to the t~lctS as they exist. Cool v. Mountainview Landowners Coop. Ass'n, 139 Id.

no, 772, 86 P.3cl 484, 486 (2004). Although parol evidence generally cannot be submitted to
contradict, vary, add or sllbtract [r'om the tenl1S of a written af,'Teement that is deemed
unambiguolls on its face, there is an exception to this general rule where a latent ambiguity
appears. Salfeety v. Seidem an ( In re Estate of Kirk), 127 Id. 817, 824, 907 P.2d 794, 801
(1995). V/11ere the facts in existence reveal a latent ambiguity in a contract, the court seeks to
determine the intent of tIle pmiies at the time tbey entered into the contract. Knipe Land Co. v.
Robertson, 201 1 WL 2039635 (Idabo 2011).
The two 1etters authored by COlmie Taylor ( R. 000535, 000561) like any other foml of
evidence can be used to demonstrate inconsistent statements and impeach the one who uttered
such a statement. Tbe letters, like tbe Taylor brothers' sworn testimony, contradict the Taylor
brothers' and their counsels' aIIegation that a typographical enor existed in tbe verified petition
in November 2004. Carmie Taylor's letter of Apri114, 2004 is proximately related in time to the
swam stMements llnder oath a few months later contained in tbe verified petition in the probate
proceedings on November 11,2004. The letters in the record are yet additional examples
evidencing the Respondents' cIiminal conduct.
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G.

The Appellants Were DeIl)rived of Their Fundamental Right to Faidy and Fully
Adjudicate Their Claims Before Judge Wilper.
Tbe Taylor brothers argue that there is no consequence, even if tlley committed peljUlY to

obtain a jUdf,'111en t. The Taylor brothers argue the land transaction was declared void and
rescission was not an issue for detemlination. (Taylor brothers' Reply Bliefp. I I). The case of
State v. WolfJ-ul11, 145 Id. 44, 175 P.3d 206, '(Ct. App. 2007), in defIning the elements of a charge
of peIjury, explain that the test for materiality is whether the testimony probably could influellce
a court on tl1e issue before it. The false statement need not bear directly upon tIle ultimate issue
offact. The de2::,rree ofmateliaIity is not important.... It is sufficient that it was material, and might
have been used to affect such proceeding.
Although tbe Appellants requested Judge Wilper to balance the equities between the trust
and themselves, Judge Wilper denied such a requests. All that remained in Judge Wilper's
opinion was a tlial on tl1e unjust eruic1ullent claim relating to the enhanced value of the forty acre
parcel improved by the Appellants. The Respondents fail to address the established case law in
Idaho which allows a claim to title and possession of real propeliy when the Stahlte of Frauds is
violated. The Appellants were led to believe by the Taylor brothers' predecessor, Beth Rogers
that t1le trust Vi/auld honor the real estate transaction. Based upon written assurances, the
Appellants proceeded to incur building costs to their detriment. Because Judge Wilper believed
tbe Taylor brothers were beneficiaries no determination was made involving the relationship
between tbe trust and the Appellants. Judge Wilper's COUli never resolved any of the issues
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SUlTOl.lI1ding the detriment to the Mailes of investing monies to develop real property acquired in
a transaction thM the successor trustee Beth Rogers assured them the trust would honor. (R.
00053c)).
TIle case of Gamer v. Bmischi, 139 Td. 430, 80 P.3d 1031 (2003) provides the elements
of quasi-estoppel. TIle Gamer, supra, case held:
Quasi-estoppel prevents a pariy £'0111 reaping un unconscionable advantage, or
from imposing an unconscionable disadvantage upon another, by changing
positions. Ltmders v. Estate of Snyder, 131 Id. 689, 695, 963 P.2d 372,378
(1998). Quasi-estoppel, unlike equitable estoppel, does not require
misrepresentation by one party or actual reliance by tne other. ..
The elements of quasi-estoppel have been defined as follows:
[IJt precludes a pmiy [r'om asseriing to another's disadvantage a right inconsistent
with a position previously taken by him or her. TIle doctrine applies where it
would be unconscionable to allow a person to maintain a position inconsistent
with one in which he acquiesced or of which he accepted a benefit. The act of the
pmiy against whom the estoppel is sought must have gained some advantage to
himself or produced some disadvantage to another; or the person invoking tlle
estoppel must have been induced to change his position.
If a contract is illegal and void, the cOUli will leave the pmiies as it finds them and refuse
to enforce the contract. Wemecke v. St. Maries Joint School Dist. # 401,147 Id. 277, 287, 207
P.3d 1008,1018 (2009). Ifa land transaction is fullyperfollDed and all the obligations attempted
to be done by such contract became accomplished facts, the mal111er in which the contract was
first executed is no longer tbe controlling issue. FaITar v. Parish, 42 Id. 451,245 P. 934 (1926).
The Appellants were denied their day in comi relating to the remedies available vv'ith tbe
trust, as referenced by Justice Eismm1l1, in Taylor v. Maile II. Judge Wilper precluded
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SUc:ll

an

adjudication solely as a reslllt of the criminal behavior of the Respondents.

H. the Jury Verdict Cm Not Stano.
The Taylor brothers asseli that the Appellants' filing of the peI]Ury complaint was with no
legitimate tactual or legal basis and was a violation ofI.R.C.P. Rule 11 (a)(l), which is
sanctionable under Idaho Code § 12-123, which demonstrates an improper use of the legal
system. (Taylor brothers' Reply Briefp. IS). The appellants have never been sanctioned under
Rule 11 either by Judge Wilper or Judge Greenwood. The Taylor brothers specificaIly requested
sanctions against the appellants, for the filing of a motion to foreclose their vendee's lien in
Judge Wilper's Court and at the same time proceeding with t1le Cl.l1Tent action before Judge
Greenwood. Judge WiIper on March 10,2010, entered his Order Denying Defendants' Motion
for Foreclosure of Vendee's Lien and Denying Plaintiffs' Motion for Sanctions. (R. 001614).
Being fully appraised of tIle record in both his case and Judge Greenwood's case, Judge WiIper
stated, "the COUli finds that Defendants' motion to foreclose the vendee's lien is not without a
basis in law or fact and was reasonable under the circumstances. Plaintiffs' motion for sanctions
is denied". (R. 001618). The very fact that the Judge Wilper found in March 2010, that tllere
were no sanctionable offenses in proceeding with two cases in litigation, makes it even harder to
understand how a jury could disa&'Tee. The paint of Judge Wilper's detem1ination shows tbat
litigants, such as the Appellants, had a reasonable basis to pursue the exact course of action
undeliaken by the appeIIants. There can not be a finding that there was a wiIIful improper use of
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legal process in the regular COllrse of the proceeding, and/or (2) the act was committed for an
ulterior, improper pUlvose. If it were otllerwise Judge Wilper would have sanctioned the actions
of the Appellants in :/I.1m-cll 20 I O. The jury verdict undenllinecl the prior ruling by Judge Wilper
\vhich was determined upon the same record which the jury considered. The Verdict therefore
cannot stanc!o
The appell,mts voluntarily withdrew their Notice of Lis Pendens on July I 3,2009 in
Judge Greenwood's proceedings some 10 days after Judge Greenwood"s Memorandum Decision
and Order dismissing the Appel1ants' complaint. Earlier, in Judge Wilper case, Judge 'iVilper
had ordered tllat a lis pendens could be maintained during an appeal.
Judge \Vilper ruled upon tbe Taylor brothers' motion to stlike the Lis Pendens which was
filed P110r to the Judge Wilper appeal. TIle Taylors brothers in the litigation before Judge Wilper
in 2007, requested that his court strike the Lis Pendens filed in May 2006 and/or requested that a
bond be posted during the appeal. Judge Wilper entered his Order on March 1,2007 denying the
motion. Pursuant to that order the lis pendens was authorized to remain ofrecord. (R. 001393001409). As early as March 1, 2007 the Appell ants knew that they h:Jd a right to maintain a lis

pendens even during

::Ill

uppeal. The appellants voluntarily released the Notice of Lis Pendens

long before the present appeal was filed. Under the prior judicial cletennination by Judge Wilper,
litigants were entitled to maintain a lis pendens even during an appeal. Neither the Taylor
brotbers nor the trust could have been damaged by the filing of the lis pendens before Judge

Greenwood, because the appellants are entitled to maintain a lis pendens even during the
appellate process.
Both lis pendens were properly recorded and reasonably connected to the litigation.
Although, tec1ll1ically, the Appellants Gould have maintained the lis pendens through an appeal in
the cun'ent case (as allowed by Judge Wilper dUIing the appeal in Taylor v. Maile), the
Appellants voluntarily removed the same. Likewise, the lis pendens was substituted with a
Vendee's Lien in the Judge Wilper matter. (R. 001421, 001427-001429). Judge Wilper had
approved the Vendee's Lien as a mechanism to protect the Appellants' light to payment. The
Appellants filed their VerifIed Motion to Foreclosure tbe Vendee's Lien in November 2009. (R.
001445). Until the purchase p1ice was retumed, pursuant to

I.e. § 45-1302, Appellants were

entitled to maintain their lis pendens.
54 C.J.S. Lis Pendens § 10 provides:
§ 10. Generally
The doctrine of lis pendens applies to all suits or actions which directly affect real
property. In some states, tIle cause of action must involve some legal interest in
the challenged real prope1ty in order for lis pendens to apply. Similarly, in other
states, a notice of lis pendens is authorized only as to a suit in which real prope1ty
is Itinvolved," which refers only to realty actually and directly brought into
litigatjon by pleadings in a pending suit and as to which some relief is sought
respecting that particular prope1ty. A classic example of a suit in which real
prope1ty is "in vol ved" is a suit which seeks to have a prior conveyance of the
property set asjde or declared null and void. Lis pendens applies to all claims
affecting titl e to real prope1ty, use and occupation of property, and interest in
property.
However, lis pendens generally applies not only to those actions which involve
the question of title or a possessory interest but also to litigation that does not seek
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to change tile ownership ofland in any way but does involve a detelmination of
certain rights and liabilities incident to ownership. 11ms, lis pendens applies to
actions which are brought to enforce any lien, charge, or encumbrance against real
propeliy. FUliher, it is not improper to file a lis pendens pursuant to an action
seeking equitable reIiefwith respect to the propelty thot is the subject of the lis
pendens.
The claims before Judge Wilper related initially to title and tllereafier to equitable lights
affecting the Linder Road propelty. The Vendee's Lien celiainly qualifies as a legal proceeding
which involve a detennination of celiain rights and liabilities incident to ownership. I.e. § 451301 clearly establishes this proposition and as such there was no actionable wrong committed

by any of the Appellants.
The Appellants asselied a variety of claims. The AppelIonts requested a constructive
trust to be imposed based upon the fraudulent and criminal activity of the Respondents. In
addition, tbe AppeIIants requested reliefunder the Idaho Racketeeling Statute.
The language under I.e. § 18-7803 and § 18-7804 cJearlyprovides tbat a claim only arises as a
result of activity amounting to tbe specific statutOlY criminal activity that is precisely aIJeged to
bave OCCUlTed in the present matter. Specifically the Statutes provide:
18-7803 DEFrNITIONS.
As used in this cbapter, (a) "Racketeeling" means illl}' act which is chargeabJe
or indictable lmder tbe following sections of the Idabo Code or which are
equivalent acts cbargeable or indictable as equivalent crimes ul1der the laws of any
other jurisdiction:
(l0) Fraudulent practices, false pretenses, insurance fraud, financial
transaction card climes and fraud generaIIy (sections 18-2403, 18-2706, 18-3002,
18-3101,18-3124,18-3125, 18-3126, 18-6713,41-293,41-294 and 41-1306,
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Idaho Code);
(17) PeJ:jury (sections 18-540 I and 18-5410, Idaho Code);
18-7804 PROHIBITED ACTIVITIES -- PENALTIES.
(a) It is unlawful for any person who has received any proceeds derived
directly or indirectly from a pattern ofracketeeling activity in which the person
has participated, to use or invest, directly or indirectly, any pmt ofthe proceeds or
the proceeds derived from the investment or LIse thereofin the acquisition of any
interest in, or the establislu11ent or operation of, any enterprise or real property.
One of the remedies available umleJ- the §18-7804 is a retum of real propelty obtained as
a result ofthe racketeering acti vity. Clearly the present matter involved legitimate claims to real
propelty whicl1 autl1011zed the filing oftbe lis pendens. The jury verdict was improper under
either count whicl1 the jl.lJY was allowed to consider and the verdict should be set aside.
l The Re,',pOluients Are Not Entitled to Attorney Fees Oil Appeal.
TIle Respondents have requested attomey fees pursuant to I.C. § 12- J 21, and LA.R. 41.

An award of attomey fees on appeal is appropliate "if the law is well-settled and the appellants
have made no substantial showing t110t the district court misapplied the law,'" Keller v. Rogstad,
112 Id. 484, 489, 733 P.2d 705, 71 0 (1987), quoting Davis v. Gage, 109 Id. 1019, 103 J, 711 P.2d
730,732 (Ct. App.1985). Under I.e. § 12-121, the COLlJt may award reasonable attorney fees to

tIle prevailing party in a civil action if the appellate COUlt is lett \vith the abiding belief that tIle

appeal was brought or defended frivolously, unreasonably or without foundation. Cramer v.
Slater, 146 Id. 868, 881,204 P.3d 508, 521 (1009). The Respondents have not met their burden
for any alvard of attomey fees on appeal.
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legitimate, triable issue offact, attorney fees may not be awarded uncler I.e. § 12-121 even
tJlOugh the losing party has asserted factual or Jegal claims that are frivolous, unreasonable, or
without foundation. Judge Greenwood never detennined the action ,vas frivolous, unreasonable,
or without foundation at the trial level.
An action is not deemed to have been broUgJlt frivolously simply because it ultimately
fails. Edwards v. Donart, 116 Tel. 687,688, 778 P.2d 809,810 (1989). In deciding whether an
award of attomey's fees is proper, "tIle sole question is whether the losing party's position is so
plainly fallacious as to be deemed frivolous, unreasonahle or without foundation." Sun Valley
S110ppillg Ctr., Inc. v. Idaho Power Co., 119 Id. 87,92,803 P.2d 993,998 (1991), quoting
Severson v. Henmtl1l1, 116 ld. 497, 777 P.2d269 (1989). A misperceptioI1, by a party, oftbe law
is not, by itself, umeaBonable conduct. Automobile Club Ins. Co. v. Jackson, 124 Yd. 874, 865
P.2d 965 (1993), Wil1g v. Amalgamated Sugar Co., 106 rd. 905, 91 1, 684 P.2d 307, 313 (Ct.
App.1984).
It is of interest that none of the Respondents have requested S~1l1ctjons against Appellants

for an improper appeal. The current appellate involves the same principles of law that were
argued before the lower cOuli---- the application of res judicota, the affects of a fi-oud upon a
comi by officers of a cOUli. Judge Greenwood allowed a trial on the merits relating to abuse of
process and intentional interference with business uclvantage reasoning tlwt the legal proceedings
pursued by the Appellants were for improper purpose, to harass and to increase the course of
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litigation. J\lot only "V ere tbose legal principles adva11ced in good faith in the district court before
Judge Greemvooc!, l,ui the Appellants are (]clv~l1lcing legiti111<lte legd principles in pointing out
the criminal conduct (If the Respondents in obtaining the Judgment on BCllllefkiaries' Claims.
If an appeu1 does not meet the :,tandarcls of 1.A.R. J J.1 and "it is intcll)Oscd for any
improper purpose,

SUcll

as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or neeelless increase in the cost

oflitigatiol1," then this Court "shall impose upun the person who signed it, a represented party, or

both, an appropriate sanction 'vvhich may include ... the amount of reasonable expenses incUlTecl
because of the filing ... including a rea~)()JlabJe attomey's fee." Id.; Bowls v. Pro Indiviso, Inc.,

132 Id. 371, 377, 973 P.2c1 142, 148 (1999), Rodriguez v. Dept. of Correction, 136 Idaho 90, 94,
29 P.3d -101, 405 (200 I). The Respondents have not requested sanctions pursuant to LA.R. 11.1,
as tlJere exic.;ts

110

improper purposes at the appellate level just as there was no improper pUll)()ses

at t11e tIied IeveJ.

In the present matter, tIle Appellants properJY11l8de a record demonstrating criminal
activity OIl the part of the Respondents in obtaining tIle Judgment on Beneficiaries' Cbims. Such
claims ael\'emcee! by the Appellants consisted entirely of the Respondents' own swom testimony,
verified pJeadings and statements against their interests. The Appellants properly alleged various
tort claims in addition to the fi-oudulent-crill1inal conduct of the Respondents and ottollleys fees
Clnd costs can not be assessed against the Appell::mts. The Appellants re~:pectfully request thot

this Court deny the Respondents' request for fees on
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appe~d.

iV. CONCLU,srON
Let not

~llly

it be jn the streets
pllr~;lIe wh~Jt

us

fe~II'

ofMi~lmi

the consequC'.nees of st1l1ding up against criminal ;Ictivity. \Vhether

or [I courthollse in tloi,';c, Jdaho, Jet each of us he duty'-bollnd to

is right [Ind true.

DA TED this 26(h day of September, 20 II.

THOMA,S

b.

CHRJST T. TROi'(JPlS, CClunseJ, hn'
Appellants, Berkshire Investments, Colleen
Maile.

A1AfLE IV., pro se.

I
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United States [vbil, postage prepaid, ~lclcJre.(:~;eJ as follows:
Connie W. Taylor S[ r~1U1 Henderson
Henderson LIIV Firm
900 Washington Sf. Suite J 020
Vancouver, Washington 98660
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()
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